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Abstract. We present an Authenticated Multiuser Quantum Direct
Communication(MQDC) protocol using entanglement swapping. Quan-
tum direct communication is believed to be a safe way to send a secret
message without quantum key distribution. The authentication process
in our protocol allows only proper users to participate in communication.
In this communication stage after the authentication, any two authorized
users among n users can communicate each other even though there is
no quantum communication channels between them. In the protocol, we
need only n quantum communication channels between the authenticator
and n users. It is similar to the present telephone system in which there
are n communication channels between telephone company and users and
any two designated users can communicate each other using telephone
line through the telephone company. The securities of our protocols are
analysed to be the same as those of other quantum key distribution pro-
tocols.
Introduction-One of the objects of quantum cryptography is to allow two
distant parties to share a random bit sequence without any reveals to the eaves-
dropper. The Quantum Key Distribution(QKD) protocols are regarded as un-
conditionally secure cryptography schemes. The first Quantum key distribution
was proposed by Bennett and Brassard. It is known as the BB84 protocol[1], and
it uses four different non-orthogonal states of single photon. QKD establishes a
common random key between two remote parties of communication. Afterwards
these two parties can safely exchange a secret message over the public channel by
encoding and decoding them with the distributed key. If the length of the keys
is the same as the length of the messages, the communication is unconditional
secure. It is because that one-time pad scheme with the enough length of secret
key is proved to be unconditionally secure. QKD has progressed quickly since the
first QKD protocol was designed[2,3,4,5]. QKD based on quantum mechanics is
usually non-deterministic[1,2,3,4,5]. But it is sometimes deterministic[13,14,15],
in which two remote parties get the same keys determinately.
2A novel concept of quantum direct communication (QDC) has been proposed
and pursued recently. Unlike QKD, QDC can directly send secret messages with-
out creating the key to encrypt them. In 2002, Beige et al. presented the first
QDC scheme,[6] in which messages can be read after the transmission of classi-
cal informations. Bostrom and Felbinger put forward a ping-ping scheme using
entangled pair of qubits in 2002[7]. This protocol can be used for QKD as well
as QDC. It is secure for key distribution, but is only quasisecure for QDC even
if perfect quantum channel is used. Cai modified the ping-pong protocol by re-
placing the entanglement states with single photons in mixed state[16]. However
it is unsafe in a noisy channel and disadvantaged to the opaque attack.
QDC may have wide application due to its fastness and unconditional secu-
rity. Our QDC protocol uses entangled states and the entanglement swapping
effect. It is well known that quantum entanglement swapping[8] can entangle
two quantum systems which did not interact with each other before. But these
QDC protocols have a common serious problem. If we don’t check whether only
proper users communicate each other, secret messages can be exposed to the
eavesdropper. It is, thus, important to certify the identifies of the legitimate
users in communication line so that no third party monitoring their identifica-
tion can impersonate either of them. In our protocol, Alice (or Bob) can confirm
the identification of her (or his) counterpart through the trusted third party,
Trent, who acts a role of present telephone company. When one of them wants
to communicate with the other, Trent guarantees the identification of each per-
son to his(her) counterpart. Afterwards they directly communicate each other
using quantum communication channels linking them and Trent.
Our authenticated multiuser QDC scheme using entanglement swapping con-
sists of two parts; quantum authentication mode and quantum communication
mode. After finishing authentication mode to identify each other, the messages
are transmitted secretly and directly in communication mode.
Entanglement swapping-Let us first describe the quantum entanglement swap-
ping. Let |0〉 and |1〉 be the horizontal and vertical polarization states of a pho-
ton, respectively. The four Bell states, |Φ±〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) and |Ψ±〉 ≡
1√
2
(|01〉± |10〉) are maximally entangled states in two-photon Hilbert space. Let
the initial state is |Φ+12〉⊗ |Φ
+
34〉. We can see that after the Bell measurements on
the pair of photon 1 and 3 and the pair of photon 2 and 4, there is an explicit
correspondence between the known initial state of the pair of two qubits and its
swapped measurement outcomes. The state |Φ+12〉 ⊗ |Φ
+
34〉 can be rearranged as
the linear combinations of the terms, |Φ+13〉 ⊗ |Φ
+
24〉, |Φ
−
13〉 ⊗ |Φ
−
24〉, |Ψ
+
13〉 ⊗ |Ψ
+
24〉
and |Ψ−13〉⊗ |Ψ
−
24〉. When the outcome of Bell measurement on the pair of photon
1 and 3 is |Φ−13〉, the Bell state of the pair of photon 2 and 4 must be |Φ
−
24〉. The
outcome of entanglement swapping is summarized in Table 1.
In our protocol, every user sends Trent the secret identity sequence of N -
bits. We call the Alice’s(Bob’s) secret identity as ID(A)(ID(B)). It must be
kept safely between the user and Trent. Let us introduce the explicit algorithm
for the protocol.
Quantum Authentication
3Table 1. The outcomes of the swapped Bell measurement on
the initially different combinations of four Bell states The ab-
breviation ID++ represents the set of four possible outcomes of Bell
measurement,(|Φ+14〉, |Φ
+
23〉),(|Φ
−
14〉, |Φ
−
23〉),(|Ψ
+
14〉, |Ψ
+
23〉), and (|Ψ
−
14〉, |Ψ
−
23〉) with
equal probability of 1/4. Similarly, the following cases can be obtained.
ID + − ⇒ {(|Ψ+14〉, |Ψ
−
23〉),(|Φ
−
14〉, |Φ
+
23〉),(|Φ
+
14〉, |Φ
−
23〉),(|Ψ
−
14〉, |Ψ
+
23〉)}, Rev +
+ ⇒ {(|Φ+14〉, |Ψ
+
23〉),(|Φ
−
14〉, |Ψ
−
23〉),(|Ψ
+
14〉, |Φ
+
23〉),(|Ψ
−
14〉, |Φ
−
23〉)}, and Rev + − ⇒
{(|Φ+14〉, |Ψ
−
23〉),(|Φ
−
14〉, |Ψ
+
23〉),(|Ψ
+
14〉, |Φ
−
23〉),(|Ψ
−
14〉, |Φ
+
23〉)}.
|Φ+34〉 |Φ
−
34〉 |Ψ
+
34〉 |Ψ
−
34〉
|Φ+12〉 ID ++ ID+− Rev ++ Rev +−
|Φ−12〉 ID +− ID++ Rev +− Rev ++
|Ψ+12〉 Rev ++ Rev +− ID ++ ID +−
|Ψ−12〉 Rev +− Rev ++ ID +− ID ++
(A.0) Authentication process begins when Alice asks Trent that she wants to com-
municate with Bob.
(A.1) Trent prepares an ordered set of 2N pairs of Bell state of |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+
|11〉). We denote the 2N ordered EPR pairs as [(P1(T ), P1(A)), (P2(T ), P2(A)),
...., (PN (T ), PN (A))] and [(PN+1(T ), PN+1(B)), (PN+2(T ), PN+2(B)), ...., (P2N (T ), P2N (B))].
Here the subscript indicates the ordering number of pairs, and T , A, and B
represent the qubits of Trent, Alice and Bob, respectively.
(A.2) Trent takes one qubit from each EPR pair, say,[P1(T ), P2(T ), ..., PN (T )]
([PN+1(T ), PN+2(T ), ..., P2N (T )]) which is called theA(B)-checking sequence,
and keep it safely. The remaining sequence of qubits [P1(A), P2(A), ..., PN (A)]
([PN+1(B), PN+2(B), ..., P2N (B)]) is called theA(B)-authentication sequence.
(A.3) Trent encodes A(B)-authentication sequence with Alice’s(Bpb’s) identifica-
tion numbers ID(A) (ID(B)). If the i-th value of ID(A) is 1, Trent makes
an Hadamard operation H to i-th qubit of A(B)-authentication sequence. If
it is 0, identity operation I is applied. The results of the operation on Pi(A)
is {(1− IDi(A))I + IDi(A)H}Pi(A).
(A.4) Trent sends the A(B)-authentication sequences [P1(A), P2(A), ..., PN (A)],
([PN+1(B), PN+2(B), ..., P2N (B)]) to Alice(Bob).
(A.5) The legitimate user, Alice(Bob) knows her(his) ID sequence. She(he) de-
codes the A(B)-authentication sequence with her(his) ID sequence. The
decoding method is the same as the Trent’s encoding method. According
to the ID sequence, Alice(Bob) makes an Hadamard operation H or does
nothing to the qubits of A(B)-authentication sequence. By this decoding op-
eration, the qubits are restored to their original state. Then she(he) measures
her(his) sequence in the σz basis, and announces the outcomes.
(A.6) Trent measures the ordered A(B)-checking sequence and compare the results
with the Alice’s(Bob’s) results. If Alice’s(Bob’s) result is the same as Trent’s,
then authentication succeeded. Otherwise, authentication failed and abort
communication.
4Quantum Direct Communication
(C.1) Alice prepares a random sequence of M + n+ q Bell states from two states,
|Φ+〉TA A =
1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) and |Ψ+〉TA A =
1√
2
(|01〉 + |10〉).. This random
choice is Alice’s secret information. Bob prepares M + n + q Bell states of
|Φ+〉TB B =
1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉).. The subscripts of the states represents who is
going to keep them after the process of (C.2).
(C.2) Alice(Bob) takes one qubit from each pair and sends Trent the ordered string
ofM+n+q qubits which is named as the A-sequence(B-sequence) hereafter.
Alice(Bob) stores the remaining ordered sequence of qubits in a safe place,
which is named as the encoding sequence (the decoding sequence) hereafter.
(C.3) Alice randomly chooses n checking positions of the ordered encoding se-
quence and publicly announces it. Trent measures the n checking qubits of
the ordered A-sequence by using σz basis and tells the outcomes to Alice.
Alice measures the corresponding qubits of the encoding sequence by using
σz basis and compares it with Trent’s outcomes. She estimates error rate and
can detect a eavesdropper. Bob’s checking method is the same as that of Al-
ice and Trent. They can detect eavesdropper on the channel of Alice-Trent
or Bob-Trent.
(C.4) Trent performs Bell measurements on the qubits of the ordered A and B
sequences. In this Bell measurement, Trent does not have to distinguish all
of four different Bell states, but only needs to distinguish |Φ±〉 and |Ψ±〉
states. After the Trent’s measurement, the encoding sequence possessed by
Alice and the decoding sequence possessed by Bob became to be entan-
gled(Entanglement Swapping). Trent sends his measurement outcomes to
Alice.
(C.5) Alice receives the Trent’s outcome and measures the encoding sequence with
σz basis. She randomly chooses q checking positions of the ordered encoding
sequence and publicly announces the positions. Bob performs measurement
on the corresponding q checking positions of the decoding sequence with
σz basis and tells the outcome to Alice. Alice can infer Bob’s measurement
outcome from the effect of entanglement swapping, the information of Trent’s
measurement outcome, her initial Bell state and her measurement outcome.
Alice compares her inference with Bob’s corresponding announcements. If
there is no eavesdropper on the line, their corresponding results should be
correlated. If there is no correlation, the communication is aborted. Table 2
shows the correlations.
(C.6) According to Alice’s bit strings, she publicly announces the positions that
Bob needs to flip his measurement outcome on his decoding sequence. As
she knows Bob’s measurement outcome by using entanglement swapping
effect, she can send decoding information to Bob. Bob flips the value of
his measurement outcome of the position that Alice informed. Then he can
decode the her secret message.
For example, let’s suppose that Alice prepares the ordered set of Bell states
{|Φ+〉, |Φ+〉, |Ψ+〉}, and Trent’s Bell measurement outcomes are {|Φ+〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ+〉}.
5Table 2. The correlation of entanglement swapping
Bob’s Alice’s Trent’s Bell Alice’s outcome Bob’s outcome
initial state initial state measurement outcome
|Φ±〉 0 0
|Φ+〉 1 1
|Ψ±〉 0 1
|Φ+〉 1 0
|Φ±〉 0 1
|Ψ+〉 1 0
|Ψ±〉 0 0
1 1
When Alice’s measurement outcomes of the encoding sequence are {0, 0, 1}, Al-
ice knows that Bob’s outcomes must be {0, 1, 1}. Suppose that Alice’s secret
message bit is 101. According to the message, Alice publicly announces 110 which
designates the positions Bob needs to flip his measurement outcome. After the
flipping, Alice’s message is transferred to Bob.
Security analysis - The proof of the security of our QDC protocol is based
on the security of the transmission of the A- and B-sequence. The state of
the transmitted qubits does not contain any information of the secret message
because they are completely random and mixed. The exposed information is
just random like that of coin flipping. In our protocol, even Trent can not know
Alice’s secret message since he doesn’t know Alice’s initial state.
The qubit transmission and the checking method in our protocol is similar to
the procedure in BBM92 QKD protocol[10]. Alice stores the encoding-sequence
in her safe place, and Eve cannot access it at all. Therefore, the security of our
protocol is the same as that of the BBM92 QKD protocol. The proof of security
for BBM92 protocol in ideal and practical conditions has been given [11,12]. So
our protocol is also unconditionally secure.
Conclusion - We have established the authenticated quantummultiuser direct
communication using entanglement swapping. Its security is the same as that of
BBM92 protocol, which is unconditionally secure. The encoding of the message
is processed only after the authentication of the users and the confirmation of
the security of the quantum channel. Our protocol, therefore, is not in danger
of exposure of information to Eve. Furthermore the leaked information to Eve
is totally random, and does not contain any information.
In this protocol we need only EPR paris. It can be advantage in an experi-
ment. The great feature of our protocol is that any two users among n subscribers
can communicate each other. We don’t need any quantum channel linking two
users, because the center, Trent, connects two users Alice and Bob, and authen-
ticates them. This structure is the same as that of nowadays telephone system,
but its security is much better than present technology. It is unconditionally
secure. Our scheme may be used for the safe communication system.
6References
1. C.H.Bennett and G.Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE international Confer-
ence on Computers, System and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New
York, 1984), pp. 175-179.
2. A.K.Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661, (1991).
3. C.H.Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
4. L.Goldenberg and L.Vaidman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 1239 (1995).
5. M.Ardehali, H.F.Chau, and H.-K.Lo, e-print quant-ph/9803007.
6. A.Beige, B.-G.Englert, Ch.Kurtsiefer, and H.Weinfurter, Acta Phys. Pol.
A 101, 357(2002).
7. K.Bostrom and T.Felbinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002).
8. M.Zukowski, A.Zeilinger, M.A.Horne, and A.K.Ekert, Event-ready-
detectors Bell experiment via entanglement swapping,Phys. Rev. Lett. 71, 4287
(1993).
9. Fu-Guo Deng, Gui Lu Long, and Xiao-Shu Liu, Phys. Rev. A , 68, 04231
(2003).
10. C.H.Bennett, G,Brassard, and N.D.Mermin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 557 (1992).
11. H.Inamori, L.Rallan, and V.Vedral, J.Phys. A 34, 6913 (2001).
12. E.Waks, A.Zeevi, and Y.Yamamoto, Phys. Rev. A 65 052310 (2002).
13. M.Koashi and N.Imoto, Phys. Rev. Lett. 79, 2383 (1997).
14. C.H.Bennett and S.J. Wisner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 69, 2881 (1992).
15. W.Y.Hwang, I.G.Koh, and Y.D, Han, Phys. Lett. A 244, 489 (1998).
16. Q.Y.Cai, quant-ph/0304033.
